Kyberz
Bearcat
A bit of a long read but well worth the time. What surprised me is that there is no comprehensive manual. It seems be based more on tradition than anything else.
http://web.archive.org/web/20061213101112/http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/1998/summer/art7su98.htm
"...Of all activities studied by our research group, flight operations at sea is the closest to the "edge of the envelope"--operating under the most extreme conditions in the least stable environment, and with the greatest tension between preserving safety and reliability and attaining maximum operational efficiency. Both electrical utilities and air traffic control emphasize the importance of long training, careful selection, task and team stability, and cumulative experience. Yet the Navy demonstrably performs very well with a young and largely inexperienced crew, with a "management" staff of officers that turns over half its complement each year, and in a working environment that must rebuild itself from scratch approximately every eighteen months. Such performance strongly challenges our theoretical understanding of the Navy as an organization, its training and operational processes, and the problem of high-reliability organizations generally.
It will come as no surprise to this audience that the Navy has certain traditional ways of doing things that transcend specifics of missions, ships, and technology. Much of what we have to report interprets that which is "known" to naval carrier personnel, yet is seldom articulated or analyzed. We have been struck by the degree to which a set of highly unusual formal and informal rules and relationships are taken for granted, implicitly and almost unconsciously incorporated into the organizational structure of the operational Navy."
http://web.archive.org/web/20061213101112/http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/1998/summer/art7su98.htm
"...Of all activities studied by our research group, flight operations at sea is the closest to the "edge of the envelope"--operating under the most extreme conditions in the least stable environment, and with the greatest tension between preserving safety and reliability and attaining maximum operational efficiency. Both electrical utilities and air traffic control emphasize the importance of long training, careful selection, task and team stability, and cumulative experience. Yet the Navy demonstrably performs very well with a young and largely inexperienced crew, with a "management" staff of officers that turns over half its complement each year, and in a working environment that must rebuild itself from scratch approximately every eighteen months. Such performance strongly challenges our theoretical understanding of the Navy as an organization, its training and operational processes, and the problem of high-reliability organizations generally.
It will come as no surprise to this audience that the Navy has certain traditional ways of doing things that transcend specifics of missions, ships, and technology. Much of what we have to report interprets that which is "known" to naval carrier personnel, yet is seldom articulated or analyzed. We have been struck by the degree to which a set of highly unusual formal and informal rules and relationships are taken for granted, implicitly and almost unconsciously incorporated into the organizational structure of the operational Navy."
